The Goldsboro incident in January 1961 involving a B-52 Stratofortress and two Mark-39 thermonuclear weapons had the potential for catastrophic consequences. As the aircraft experienced a fuel leak, it disintegrated mid-air, leading to uncertainty regarding the fate of the two bombs on board.

Initially, it was believed that one bomb ejected and its parachute deployed, allowing a controlled descent and landing in a tree. The other bomb was thought to have remained onboard until impact, burying itself in the ground. However, conflicting reports emerged, suggesting both bombs fell from the B-52. One bomb’s parachute deployed, allowing it to land without detonating, while the other bomb’s parachute failed to deploy, setting off certain arming indicators. Fortunately, critical components necessary for detonation were damaged, preventing an explosion.

Forensic investigations revealed that all but one of the safety switches on the second bomb had triggered inadvertently, preventing a nuclear blast. Uncertainty surrounded the number of safety switches, with varying claims of four or six switches, and most accounts indicating all but one had been activated. However, damage caused by the aircraft breakup rendered some switch contacts ineffective, potentially altering the bomb’s arming status.

Had the situation unfolded differently, the impact could have resulted in a devastating nuclear explosion equivalent to 3.8 million tons of TNT, posing immense danger to Goldsboro and its surroundings.

The public was unaware of the true extent of the incident until 2013 when author Eric Schlosser’s FOIA request unearthed additional details about the bomb’s safety mechanisms. This revelation led President John F. Kennedy to implement measures aimed at reducing accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonations, including a reduction in Strategic Air Command alert activity and the installation of permissive action links (PALs) requiring a secret code for nuclear bomb activation.